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Chris Tennant* Justification and Cultural Authority
in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982: Regina v. Sparrow
I. Introduction
Regina v. Sparrow1 is the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
under s.35(1) of the Constitution Ac 1982. The case has wide-reaching
implications for the recognition and limitation of aboriginal rights. This
case comment will explore some of the implications of Sparrow, with a
focus on the test developed by the Court for the justification of
government regulation of aboriginal rights. In particular, the question of
the cultural authority of non-aboriginal judges to justify legislation
regulating aboriginal rights will be addressed. 2
1. Regina v. Sparrow
On May 25, 1984, Ron Sparrow was fishing for salmon in the Fraser
River near his reserve. He was using a drift-net 45 fathoms long. At the
time, the Indian food fishing license of the Musqueam Band specified that
no drift-net longer than 25 fathoms could be used to catch salmon.
Sparrow was charged under s. 61(1) of the Fisheries Acts with violating
the terms of the Band's food fishing license. At trial, Sparrow admitted
the particulars of the offence, but defended the charge on the grounds that
he was exercising an aboriginal right to fish. He argued that the drift-net
length restricted in the band's license was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Ac4 1982, and was therefore invalid.
Section 35 of the Constitution Ac 1982 reads as follows:
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian,
Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.
*Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. 1991. I would like to thank M.E. Turpel, a teacher, colleague
and friend. Any errors or omissions are of course my own. The law is correct as of April, 1991.
1. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385,11990] 4 W.WR. 410, afl'g (1986), 32 C.C.C.
(3d) 65, 36 D.L.R. (4th) 246, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 577, 9 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300: Hereinafter referred
to as "Sparrow" All references are to 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
2. Other aspects of Sparrow are emphasized in two recent case-comments: M. Asch and P.
Macklem, "Aboriginal Right and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R v. Sparrow" (1991),
29 Alta. L.R. 498 (self-government and aboriginal sovereignty); WIC. Binnie, "The Sparrow
Doctrine: The Beginning of the End or the Beginning?" (1990), 15 Queen's LJ. 217 (the
importance of renewed political negotiations to address aboriginal issues).
3. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
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(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes
rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
Sparrow was convicted of the fisheries offence at trial. The Provincial
Court Judge found that no person could claim an aboriginal right unless
supported by a treaty, proclamation, contract or other document. The
County Court refused Sparrow's appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed
Sparrow's appeal from the County Court judgment.4 The Court found
that the evidence that was before the trial judge was sufficient to establish
that Sparrow was exercising an existing aboriginal ight, and ordered a
new trial. Mr. Sparrow appealed, and the Crown cross-appealed. On
May 31, 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeal, dismissing both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The unanimous
judgment of the Court was written jointly by Dickson C.J.C. and La
Forest J. The judgment set out a test to determine if legislation is in
violation of s. 35(1). As articulated, the test is expansive and will help to
define the future direction of the s. 35(1) jurisprudence. Although the
issue before the court was the narrow one of an aboriginal right to fish for
food, Sparrow will provide a basis for the analysis of other aboriginal
rights as well. In addition, although no treaty rights were at issue in
Sparrow, the case will also likely provide the framework for analysis of
treaty rights under s. 35(1). 5
The Supreme Court articulated a two part test to determine if
legislation infringes s. 35(1). In the first stage, the onus is upon the party
challenging the legislation (i.e. the aboriginal person) to prove the
existence of the aboriginal right, and to establish that the right has been
infringed by the legislation. If the aboriginal person is successful, then
consideration moves to the second stage, where the onus is upon the
party seeking to uphold the legislation (i.e. the Crown) to establish that
the legislation is justifiable. Legislation is justifiable only if it has a valid
objective and is consistent with the fiduciary obligation owned by the
Crown to aboriginal peoples.
II. A Violation of an AboriginalRight
Prior to the judgment of Dickson J. (as he then was) in Guerin v. The
Queen,6 there were two competing notions of aboriginal rights. On one
view, aboriginal rights were seen to be contingent on their recognition by
4. Supra, note 1.
5. The Sparrow test was applied to treaty rights in R. v. Joseph, [1990] 4 C.N.LR. 59
(B.C.S.C.).
6. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 55 N.R. 161 (sub nom Guerin v. Canada), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321,
[1984] 6 W.W.R 481, 59 B.C.L.R. 301, 36 RP.R 1, 20 E.T.R. 6, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120.
Hereinafter "Guerin."All references are to (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
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the Crown at the time of European settlement.7 In other words, there
were no aboriginal rights beyond those conferred by action of the
European-settler state. The other view was that aboriginal rights are an
inherent aspect of aboriginality, and that no recognition by the Crown is
required to animate them. On this view, aboriginal rights derive from the
nature of aboriginal communities, because "[tlhe production and
reproduction of native forms of community require a system of rights and
obligations that reflect and protect unique relations that native people
have with nature, themselves and other communities."'8 In Guerin,
Dickson J. adopted the inherent approach to aboriginal rights. He
recognized that the rights of the Musqueam to their land, though
recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and other Crown Acts,
were independent of such acts and predated them.9
In Sparrow, Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J., writing for a unanimous
court, re-affirm an inherent theory of aboriginal rights. Prior to Sparrow,
a test often referred to for the proof of an aboriginal right was that in
Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development),10 a case raising a question of common law
aboriginal title. Mahoney J. set out a strict four-part test, requiring proof,
inter alia, not only of occupation of the territory in question but that the
occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies. In Sparrow,
the Supreme Court adopts a considerably more flexible approach to
proof of constitutionally protected aboriginal rights. On the facts, the
Musqueam did not occupy their territory to the complete exclusion of
others, nor did they historically inhabit the land immediately around
Canoe Passage where Ron Sparrow was fishing.1" The Court indicates
that an aboriginal right will come into being as the result of the social and
cultural practices of an aboriginal community. To be an aboriginal right,
a practice must be of long-standing, pre-dating the arrival of the
Europeans, and must have been and remain an integral part of the lives
of the aboriginal people in question.12 There are indications in the case
that there must be some connection, though not necessarily a direct
connection, between the aboriginal right and land traditionally occupied
by the aboriginal people.
7. St Catherine's Milling Co. v.R., (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46,4 Cart. 107, affg, 13 S.C.R. 577,
which affirmed 13 O.A.R. 148, which affirmed 10 O.R. 196.
8. M. Asch and P. Macklem, supra, note 2, p. 502.
9. Supra note 6, p. 336.
10. [1980] 1 F.C. 518, 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 193, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17.
Additional reasons at [1981] 1 EC. 266 (T.D.).
11. M.R.V. Storrow, Q.C. and M.A. Morellato, "Fishing Rights and the Sparrow Case", in
AboriginalLaw (materials prepared for B.C. Continuing Legal Education, April 1990).
12. Supra, note 1, pp. 3 98-9 9.
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If an aboriginal right is defined by the social practice of the aboriginal
community, then in defining the right, the courts must be sensitive to
aboriginal understandings of their own cultural practices. The Supreme
Court of Canada makes this point explicitly: "it is possible, and, indeed,
crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning
of the rights at stake."'13 Because aboriginal rights are sui generis, they
need not conform to traditional common law rights. In the context of
Sparrow, the Supreme Court noted that the fishing rights at issue:
.. are not traditional property rights. They are rights held by a collective
and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that. group. Courts
must be careful, then, to avoid the application of traditional common law
concepts of property as they develop their understanding of what the.
reasons for judgment in Guerin... referred to as the 'ui generis" nature
of aboriginal rights...-14
The Supreme Court of Canada rejects the notion that aboriginal rights
should be "frozen", either in their traditional form or in their pre-1982
regulated form. Instead, aboriginal rights must be interpreted flexibly "so
as to permit their evolution over time." 15 The aboriginal right-holders are
not confined to traditional practices or technologies in exercising the
right. 16
Aboriginal rights may be extinguished by state action. The Supreme
Court of Canada interprets the qualifier "existing" in s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act 1982 to mean "unextinguished": only rights which were
not extinguished prior to 1982 are recognized and affirmed by s.35 of the
Constitution Act 198217 The Court rejects the notion that aboriginal
rights which were regulated prior to 1982 (such as the right to fish) are
recognized and affirmed in their regulated form as of 1982. To
constitutionalize regulated rights would result in a "constitutional
patchwork quilt", with aboriginal rights varying with the different
regulatory schemes in different jurisdictions as of 1982.18 Instead, the
continuing right of the Federal government to regulate aboriginal rights
is recognized, but all regulation, whenever enacted, must be justified by
the Crown under the Sparrow test.
13. ]bid, p. 411.
14. Ibid, p. 411.
15. Ibid, p. 397.
16. This fact was apparently ignored in the post-Sparrow case of R. v. Gladstone (1990), B.C.
Prov. Ct., (unreported). Judge Lemiski concluded that the aboriginal accused were not
exercising an aboriginal right because there was no evidence "that the Accused were
conducting a transaction 'in keeping with the culture and existence' of the Heiltsuk Band. To
the contrary, they were acting in a manner not dissimilar to the manner in which criminals
transport and sell narcotics" (pp. 16-17).
17. Supra, note 1, p. 395 .
18. ibid, p. 397.
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The Court reiterates the principle that for an aboriginal right to have
been extinguished prior to 1982, the intention of the sovereign to
extinguish the right must have been "clear and plain".19 The Crown's
argument that an aboriginal right is extinguished whenever the sovereign
acts in a manner necessarily inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of
the right is rejected. Even though the fisheries regulations denied Indians
the right to fish except on a discretionary basis, the Court finds that
"[t]hese permits were simply a manner of controlling the fisheries, not
defining underlying rights."20
The question of the extinguishment of aboriginal rights after 1982
however, remains open. By implication of s. 35(3), aboriginal rights can
be surrendered voluntarily by aboriginal peoples, and so extinguished, in
exchange for land claims agreements and presumably for other treaty
rights as well. But it is doubtful that extinguishment of aboriginal rights
without consent is possible after 1982. In Sparrow, the Court refers in
passing to a "situation of expropriation". 21 One interpretation of the
phrase is that there will be cases in which the expropriation and
extinguishment of aboriginal rights will be justified under the Sparrow
test. However, the possibility of expropriation is difficult to reconcile with
the wording of s. 35(1), which states categorically that existing aboriginal
rights are "recognized and affirmed." The constitutional entrenchment of
aboriginal rights surely precludes their extinguishment short of a
constitutional amendment. A "situation of expropriation" could be taken
to mean a situation where government policy or legislation interferes so
substantially with the exercise of the aboriginal right that it cannot
effectively be exercised at all. Although such a policy or legislation might
be justifiable under the Sparrow test, the aboriginal right would not itself
be extinguished, and would revive if the situation of expropriation ended.
1. The prima facie violation ofs.35(1)
Once the aboriginal right had been identified, the Court sets out a three-
part test to determine if a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1) has
occurred. The onus of proving aprimafacie infringement is on the group
challenging the legislation (i.e. the aboriginal claimant). The first
requirement is proof that the limitation on the aboriginal right is
unreasonable. If proof of unreasonableness is more than a nominal
requirement, it will place an onerous burden on aboriginal claimants.
19. Ibid, p. 401, adopting the test for extinguishment given by Hall J. in Calder v. British
Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, at 210, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 68; aflg
13 D.L.R. (3d) 64,74 W.W.R- 481; which affirmed 8 D.L.R. (3d) 59,71 W.WR. 81.
20. bid, p. 401.
21. Ibid, p. 416.
R. v. Sparrow
Furthermore, the requirement would be redundant, since the Crown
must in effect prove the reasonableness of the limitation in the second
part of the Sparrow test. The proof of unreasonableness should be viewed
as a threshold requirement to weed out spurious claims. For example,
proof of another method of managing the resources more in keeping with
the aboriginal right should be a sufficient demonstration of unreasonable-
ness. In the post-Sparrow case of R. v. Gladstone,22 Judge Lemiski
adopted an even lower threshold of unreasonableness. Judge Lemiski
found that the fact that the aboriginal right had been exercised "to some
extent" prior to the arrival of the Europeans, coupled with the fact that
the Europeans had interfered with the aboriginals' "activity choices", was
sufficient to establish that the limitation was unreasonable.
The second and third requirements to establish a prima facie
infringement are that the regulation or legislation imposes an undue
hardship, and that the regulation denies to the right-holders their
preferred means of exercising the right. On the facts of Sparrow, the
purpose of the test is to determine "whether the purpose or effect of the
restriction on net length unnecessarily infringes the interests protected by
the fishing right."24 To the extent that these requirements are rigorously
applied, they should be seen as alternative requirements. If the party
challenging the legislation proves that either in purpose or in effect the
legislation imposes an undue hardship or prevents the right-holders from
exercising their right as they would wish, then there is a prima facie
infringement of s. 35(1).
III. The Justificatory Standard
The Sparrow doctrine permits state regulation of aboriginal rights which
have been constitutionally entrenched by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act
1982 provided that such regulation is justified. Although there is no
language in s. 35(1) explicitly permitting the justification of legislation
restricting aboriginal rights, the Court reads s. 35(1) in conjunction with
Federal legislative powers in the Constitution. To reconcile s. 35(1) with
Federal powers, Federal legislation infringing s. 35(1) aboriginal rights
must be justified under a two-part test: it must be enacted pursuant to a
valid objective, and it must uphold the honour of the Crown. The party
seeking to uphold the regulation (i.e. the Crown) bears the onus of
justification.
22. Supra, note 16.
23. !bid, p. 11.
24. Supra, note 1, p. 412.
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1. The standard
The first requirement is a valid legislative objective. Sparrow provides
some guidance for determining what a "valid" objective might be. In the
context of fishing, the Court suggests that the objective of conservation
and resource management will generally be valid. Legislation with the
objective of conservation would be consistent with a wide range of
aboriginal rights, since "... the conservation and management of our
resources is consistent with aboriginal beliefs and practices, and, indeed,
with the enhancement of aboriginal rights, ' 25 The Court also suggests
that the objective of preserving s. 35(1) rights would be valid, as would
legislation preventing the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would harm the
general population of aboriginal peoples. Beyond these objectives, the
Court says only that such "other objectives found to be compelling and
substantial" would be valid.26
It is difficult to generalize about the exact nature of valid legislative
objectives for the purposes of s. 35(1) analysis. This is particularly true
because of the Supreme Court's clear indication that a case-by-case
approach is appropriate to the justificatory standard:
We wish to emphasize the importance of context and a case-by-case
approach to s. 35(1). Given the generality of the text of the constitutional
provision, and especially in light of the complexities of aboriginal history,
society and rights, the contours of a justificatory standard must be defined
in the specific factual context of each case. 27
Nonetheless, a pattern does emerge from the Sparrow judgment.
Regulations that protect s. 35(1) rights, whether fishing rights or
otherwise, will have valid objectives. The example in Sparrow is fisheries
conservation legislation; another example would be environmental
protection legislation protecting the resources upon which the aboriginal
right depended.
Because of the constitutional nature of aboriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s. 35(1), very little legislation beyond that intended to uphold
or preserve s.35(1) rights should be considered to have a valid objective.
This position receives support in the Sparrow judgment. The two
examples given by the Court are legislation intended to avert harm to the
public or to the aboriginal people themselves, and legislation with some
other "compelling and substantial objective." Justifying legislation
protecting the public from harm is appropriate, so long as the potential
25. Ibid, p. 413.
26. ibid, p. 412. The "valid objective" test is in substance derived from B. Slattery,
"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, p. 7 8 2 .
27. ibid, p. 410.
R. v. Sparrow
harm is serious. Professor Slattery suggests that an example of such
legislation would be standard safety restriction for the use of firearms in
hunting.28 The further requirement that there exist no other reasonable
means of avoiding the harm would follow from the Crown's obligation
to uphold its fiduciary duty (articulated in the second part of the
justification test).
The "compelling and substantial objective" category should be viewed
as a residual category for objectives of overriding importance. There is a
suggestion in the judgment itself that the category should be construed
narrowly. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Sparrow that
objectives "in the public interest" were valid.29 The Supreme Court of
Canada rejected this category as excessively vague:
We find the "public interest" justification to be so vague as to provide no
meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the
justification of a limitation on constitutional rights. 30
If "compelling and substantial" is not to be excessively vague, it must be
given a determinate meaning., Slattery provides an appropriate
formulation when he suggests that the residual category should cover
regulations implementing "state policies of overriding importance to the
general welfare (as in times of war or emergency)". 31 A useful analogy
would be the high standard of justification required to justify an
infringement of s. 7 of the Charter.32 Such regulations would, of course,
only be justifiable so long as the exceptional circumstances continued.
If legislation is found to have a valid objective, analysis moves to the
second stage of the justification test. The Crown must establish that the
substance of the legislation is in keeping with the fiduciary duty owed by
the Crown to aboriginal peoples. The fiduciary duty of the Crown to
aboriginal peoples was first recognized in the judgment of Dickson J. (as
he then was) in Guerin.33 The recognition of the fiduciary duty in Guerin
was confined to the surrender of otherwise inalienable lands to the
Crown. The interest of the Indians in the land "gives rise upon surrender
to a distinctive fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown to deal with
28. Supra, note 26, p. 782.
29. (1986), 32 C.C.C. (3d) 65, 36 D.L.R. (4th) 246, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 577, 9 B.C.L.R. (2d)
300.
30. Supr, note 1, p. 412.
31. Supra, note 26, p. 782.
32. Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Ac4 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 485, 63 N.R. 266, per Lamer J. (as he then
was): "[s]ection 1 may... successfully come to the rescue of an otherwise violation ors. 7, but
only in cases arising out of exceptional circumstances, such as natural disasters, the outbreak
of war, epidemics, and the like." Ibid, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 485, p. 518.
33. Supra, note6.
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the land for the benefit of the surrendering Indians. ' 34 While this
fiduciary obligation is similar both to a trust and to agency, it is in fact
a sui generis obligation owed by the Crown to the Indians. In Sparrow,
Dickson C.J.C., writing with La Forest J., expands the scope of the
fiduciary principle by making it a "general guiding principle for s.
35(1): '35 The government has a general fiduciary duty to all aboriginal
peoples:
[t]hat is, the government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity
with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the
government and the aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and
contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be
defined in light of this historic relationship.36
In the context of the aboriginal right of fish for food, to uphold the
honour and fiduciary obligation of the Crown the regulatory scheme
must give first priority to the Indian right to fish for food. "The
constitutional nature of the Musqueam food fishing rights means that any
allocation of priorities after valid conservation measures have been
implemented must give top priority to Indian food fishing."37
There is a tension between judicial deference to complex regulatory
schemes designed by experts on the one hand, and on the other, judicial
intervention to hold the Crown to its fiduciary responsibility in s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act 1982. In general, the Sparrow test opts for
intervention. A valid legislative objective is insufficient: the regulatory
scheme is subject to substantive scrutiny to ensure that it is consistent
with the fiduciary duty of the Crown. A regulatory scheme will only be
consistent with the duty of the Crown if the aboriginal right holders are
given priority access to any resources beyond what is necessary to fulfill
the valid objective. Although the Court will leave the "detailed allocation
of maritime resources... to those having expertise in the area", it will
scrutinize the conservation plan to assess its priorities. 38
Beyond the two branches of the justification test, the Court in Sparrow
lists a number of additional factors which may be considered depending
on the circumstances. These factors include:
... the questions of whether there has been as little infringement as
possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of
expropriation, fair compensation is available, and whether the aboriginal
group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation
34. bid, p. 339.
35. Supra, note 1, p. 408.
36. Ibid
37. bid, p. 414.
38. Ibid
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measures being implemented. The aboriginal peoples, with their history of
conservation consciousness and interdependence with natural resources,
would surely be expected, at the least, to be informed regarding the
determination of an appropriate scheme for the regulation of the
fisheries.39
The Court acknowledges that the justificatory standard may place a
"heavy burden" on the party seeking to uphold the legislation. 40 An
onerous justificatory standard is appropriate because the constitutional
text does not explicitly state that violations of s. 35(1) rights can be
justified. In effect, only legislation that upholds the aboriginal right in
question to the extent possible within the context of a limited set of valid
legislative objectives, will be justifiable.
2. Regina v. Oakes
In Regina v. Oakes,41 Dickson C.J.C. set out what has since been
accepted as the test to be applied when legislation or government action
violating a Charter right is sought to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
The Oakes test is in two parts:
To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the
objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or
freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom" ....
Secondly... the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are
reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves "a form of
proportionality test" . ... There are, in my view, three important
components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be
arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must
be rationally connected to the objective. Secondly, the means, even if
rationally connected to the objective in the first sense, should impair "as
little as possible" the right or freedom in question .... Thirdly, there must
be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective
which has been identified as of "sufficient importance". 42
Comparisons between the justificatory standard in Sparrow and the
justificatory test set out in Oakes are inevitable. Because s. 35 is part of
the Constitution Act 1982, and not part of the Charter, the justificatory
39. Ibid, pp. 416-17.
40. bid, p. 416.
41. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 65 N.R. 87, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 24 C.C.C. (3d)
321, 14 O.A.C. 335, 19 C.R.R. 308. Hereinafter referred to as "Oakes". All references are to
26 D.LR. (4th) 200.
42. bid, p. 227 (emphasis in original).
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standard in s. 1 of the Charter does not apply to s. 35. Nor is there any
justification requirement explicitly articulated in the text of s. 35 itself.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has read a justificatory standard into
s.35(1).
Like the first branch of the Sparrow justification test, the first branch
of the Oakes test inquires into the objective of the legislation at issue. But
the Oakes standard requires only that the objective relate to "concerns
which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society."43 In
practice, the test has become in most cases a perfunctory initial threshold.
The threshold for the first branch of the Sparrow test is and should be
considerably higher. Not only is the exercise of justification not directly
mandated by the text of s. 35(1), but what is being constitutionalized are
inherent aboriginal rights which exist independently of their constitution-
alization. Accordingly, it is appropriate that if legislation is not intended
to uphold the aboriginal right in question, or to avert serious harm to the
public, then it must relate to state policies of overriding importance (such
as war or emergency).
The second branch of the Oakes test (in its three parts) requires that
the means used to achieve the objective be proportional to the objective
of the legislation. The second branch of the Sparrow test is also a form
of proportionality test, but the means must be measured against a sandard
external to the legislation, namely the fiduciary duty of the Crown: "[t]he
special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-vis
aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the
legislation or action in question can be justified."44 While the significance
of the legislative objective, and with it the permissible means, may vary,
in the case of s. 35(1) the Crown will have to prove that the means are
proportional to the consistently high standard of the Crown's fiduciary
duty.
It is important that the justificatory standard that has been read into s.
35(1) of the Constitution Ac4 1982 be allowed to develop independently
of the justificatory standard in s. 1 of the Charter. If the promise of
Dickson J. (as he then was) in Guerin that aboriginal rights are sui
generis is to have meaning, then the regulation of aboriginal rights must
be subject to a higher standard ofjustification appropriate to the fiduciary
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.
3. The judge as social critic
David Beatty argues that judges assessing government action against the
43. !bid
44. Supra, note 1, p. 413.
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standard of s. 1 of the Charter are playing the role of social critics. That
is, judges are "more or less impartial observers given the task of
evaluating the various policies Governments have enacted into law
..."45 He suggests that judges evaluate the integrity and morality of
government policies against two principles of social well-being to
determine if the policies are justifiable. The first principle is utilitarian: a
policy is not justifiable if the cost of the policy outweighs its benefits. The
second principle is that a policy is not justifiable if there is a less intrusive
means available to achieve its objectives. Beatty argues that these two
principles are a condensation of the four parts of the Oakes test. The
utilitarian principle follows from both the first part of the Oakes test
(pressing and substantial objective) and from the third proportionality
principle (proportionality between means and objective). The alternative
means principle follows both from the first (rational connection) and
second (minimal impairment) proportionality principles.
Beatty's image of the judge as a social critic is a useful lens through
which to examine the issue of justification under s. 35(1). Both of his
principles of social well-being are integral to the Sparrow justificatory
test. The utilitarian principle is apparent in the first part of the test. The
court is called upon to weigh the benefit to the right-holders of allowing
them unregulated access to the resource against the potential harm to the
general public, including the right-holders, of preventing the government
from regulating the right. The harm may consist of harm to the resource
upon which the right depends, harm to individuals, or the frustration of
government objectives of overriding importance. Where the benefit
would outweigh the harm, the regulatory scheme is at least justifiable
under the utilitarian principle. Beatty's alternative means or "Paretian"
principle is central to the second part of the justification test. A regulatory
scheme is only justifiable if there are no alternative means available of
implementing the objective of the scheme that are more consistent with
the fiduciary duty of the Crown. For example, if fisheries regulations do
not give top priority to aboriginal rights within the context of an overall
conservation plan, the regulations will not be justifiable. In fact, the Court
explicitly acknowledges the importance of the alternative means principle
when it includes minimal impairment of the aboriginal right in the list of
additional factors relevant to the justification issue.46
45. D. Beatty, "The End of Law: At Least as We Have Known It", in R-F. Devlin, Canadian
Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publication, 1991), pp. 391-413,
at p. 392.
46. Supra, note 1, p. 417.
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Like Oakes, Sparrow calls upon judges to be social critics. But there is
a difficulty with judges assuming the role of social critics in the context
of s. 35(1). Through the political process, Canadians have given
themselves a Charter and their judges the authority to act as social critics
in interpreting the Charter. But who has given judges authority to be
social critics of aboriginal societies? More fundamentally, is it even
possible for judges to understand aboriginal culture in anything other
than the dominant society's terms? The danger of misunderstanding
aboriginal culture is recognized by Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. in
Sparrow when they caution against subsuming aboriginal rights within
the traditional rights conceptions of the common law:
Fishing rights are not traditional property rights.... Courts must be
careful... to avoid the application of traditional common law concepts
of property ... it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the
aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake .... 47
But the problem goes beyond good intentions and sensitivity to
difference. The question is, can judges know difference? M.E. Turpel
argues they cannot:
Can a judge know a value which is part of an Aboriginal culture and not
of her own? The extent to which anyone can know the basic differences
as opposed to identifying difference, especially when functioning in an
institutional role defined as deciding the supreme law of a state is a
fundamental problem for constitutional analysis. This is especially the case
with respect to choices regarding different cultural systems because the
knowledge structures valued by the Canadian judicial system are
fundamentally different from the knowledge structures embraced by
Aboriginal peoples.48
The assumption that knowing difference is possible becomes a tool of
cultural hegemony.49 By assuming the authority to interpret aboriginal
culture, judges re-interpret it in the terms of their own cultural categories.
The aboriginal culture is understood through tropes like "noble savage",
"traditional life style", "civilization", and "modernization. '50
It seemed with Sparrow that the courts had come a long way in the 21
years since Davey C.J.B.C. wrote in Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.),
that the Nishga "were at the time of settlement a very primitive people
with few of the institutions of civilized society. '51 But the difficulty of
47. Ai, p. 411.
48. M. E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" (1989-90), 6 C.H.R.Y.B. 3, p. 24.
49. Ibid, p. 25.
50. See B. Ominayak and J. Ryan, "The Cultural Effects of Judicial Bias", in S.L. Martin and
K. E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and JudicialNeutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), pp. 346-357.
51. Supra, note 19, (1970), 13 D.L.1. (3d) 64, at 66 (B.C.C.A.).
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judging aboriginal culture from the perspective of the dominant society
was re-emphasized in March of 1991 by another B.C. Chief Justice,
McEachern, C.J.S.C. (as he then was). In Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia52 (the Gitskan and Wet'suwet'en land claim) McEachern J.
had occasion to comment on traditional Gitskan and Wet'suwet'en
existence:
... it would not be accurate to assume that... pre-contact existence in
the territory was in the least bit idyllic. The plaintiffs' ancestors had no
written language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation
was not uncommon, wars with neighbouring peoples were common, and
there is no doubt, to quote Hobbs, [sic] that aboriginal life in the territory
was, at best, 'nasty, brutish and short.'53
The claim is not that judges like Davey and McEachern are racist. Many
such views are held in good faith, accompanied by a genuine desire to do
what is best for aboriginal people. Such views are not extraordinary; they
are points on a continuum of dominant society understandings of
aboriginal society.
A partial response to the problem of cultural difference would be to
expand the consultation requirement articulated in Sparrow. In Sparrow,
the Court indicated that consultation with aboriginal peoples will ip some
cases be a requirement for the justification of legislation. As a first step
towards the recognition of cultural difference, consultation with
aboriginal people should be a requirement in every case where
government action will affect aboriginal rights. If no agreement can be
reached beween the aboriginal people and the government, then the
aboriginal people would be required to justify their refusal to agree to the
scheme. To the extent possible, the justification would be evaluated
according to the standards of the particular aboriginal culture and
society.54 Under the direction of the aboriginal people involved, the judge
would adopt the role of an aboriginal social critic. The judge would
retain a discretion to assess the justification according to the standards of
non-aboriginal society in those few cases where overriding concerns
warrant suppressing cultural difference. In practice, concerns important
to non-aboriginal society would also be important to aboriginal society,
52. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] B.CJ. No. 525 (B.C.S.C.).
53. I& In Leyiathan, Thomas Hobbes desmribed the life of man in the state of nature as
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." McEachem J. also indicates that the Indians "are
probably much more united and cohesive as peoples, and they are more culturally sensitive to
their birthright than they were when life was so harsh and communication so difficult."
54. Such a justificatory standard should take into account the extent to which an aboriginal
people had freely accepted a position within the Canadian political system (for example by
treaty).
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and it would generally be unnecessary for the judge to step out of the role
of an aboriginal social critic. If the aboriginal people fail to justify their
refusal to agree to the regulatory scheme, then the Crown would still be
required to justify the scheme under the two-part Sparrow test.
Otherwise, the regulatory scheme would be found to infringe s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982.
IV. Conclusion
In Sparrow, Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. articulate a basic
framework for the recognition and affi ation of aboriginal rights in s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The framework is intended to be
applicable on a case-by-case basis beyond the facts of Sparrow to all
aboriginal rights.55 Although the framework is a useful one, it leaves
important questions unanswered. The first such question is the nature of
aboriginal rights. It is clear from the case that the relationship between a
right as traditionally practised and as presently practised can be a flexible
one. But it is not clear if limits on the present practise of rights will be set
through restrictive definition of the right, or if limits will be imposed only
through justifiable regulation. In Sparrow, it was accepted that any limit
on the means of exercising the aboriginal right to fish for food would be
a matter of regulation, not of definition. It is not clear how the courts will
proceed with economically more valuable rights, where limits will
presumably be a much larger issue.
A more important question is the degree to which the courts are
prepared to recognize cultural difference within the context of s. 35.
Although the Court in Sparrow makes a genuine effort to be sensitive to
the values of aboriginal culture, the Court never relinquishes its role as a
social critic of aboriginal society. In future aboriginal rights cases, the
courts must go beyond sensitivity and bring aboriginal perspectives
directly into the courtroom. A larger number of aboriginal judges might
be a step towards this goal. But there are problems of cultural authority
even with an aboriginal judge, because of the diversity of aboriginal
cultures. What is needed is greater participation by the aboriginal people
affected in any particular case. One possibility is to make the consent of
aboriginal people a requirement for the justification of regulations
infringing aboriginal rights under s. 35 (1), and to require aboriginal
people to justify a refusal to consent to the regulations, according to the
standards of their own society and culture.
55. In Delgamuukw, McEachern J. limited the effect of Sparrow largely to aboriginal rights
to fish. Supra, note 52.
